This approach is concerned with adapting the operations of attitude determination and control subsystem (ADCS) of low earth orbit LEO satellites through analyzing the telemetry readings received by mission control center, and then responding to ADCS off-nominal situations. This can be achieved by sending corrective operational Tele-commands within real time. Our approach is related to the fuzzy membership of off-nominal telemetry readings of corrective actions through a set of fuzzy rules based on understanding the ADCS modes resulted from the satellite telemetry readings. Response in real time gives us a chance to avoid risky situations. The approach is tested on the EgyptSat-1 engineering model, which is our method to simulate the results. Ó 2016 Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
Remote sensing satellites are active elements in different orbit altitude that take very accurate pictures of the earth's surface, sending back images that tell scientists about changes occurring around the world such as crops, water, and other resources (Wertz and Larson, 2011) . Each satellite system is composed of two main parts; the space segment and the ground segment (Wertz and Larson, 2011) . The space segment includes satellite platform and payload components, while the ground segment includes data receiving station and mission control center. Mission control center subsystem consists of satellite inflight control, satellite planning, orbit determination and propagation subsystem, telemetry of on-board attitude determination, housekeeping telemetry and payload planning subsystem.
Mission control center subsystems work together according to time schedule procedure to from and generate satellite communication work plans. For the space segment shown in Fig. 1 , the attitude determination and control subsystem is responsible for the satellite orientation. The download telemetry data received in real time explain the performance of the ADCS, since the human operators have to take decisions based on the readings of telemetry data. In case of satellite orientation malfunctions the operators send correct telecommands to the satellite. This research is intended to automatically define problems caused by reaction wheel and take a correct decision without human interference.
This research introduces fuzzy logic as a solution for satellite attitude orientation malfunctions, and an attempt to keep satellite always in save mode.
Materials and methods

ADCS subsystem
The attitude determination and control subsystem makes a stabilization concept for the satellite and orients it in the desired directions during the mission in spite of the external disturbance torques acting on the subsystem. This requires more determination of its altitude as well as its orientation sensors, and more control of its actuators (Zadeh).
Attitude sensors
Sun Sensors (SS): are visible-light detectors which measure one or two angles between their mounting base and incident sunlight.
Star Sensors: measure the star coordinates in the spacecraft frame and provide attitude information when these observed coordinates are compared with known star directions obtained from a star catalog.
Magnetometers (MM): are sensors which measure the size and direction of the earth's magnetic field to determine the orientation of a spacecraft with respect to the local magnetic field.
Global Positioning System (GPS): GPS receivers are known as high-accuracy navigation devices used to determine attitude by employing the differential signals from separate antennas on a satellite.
Angular velocity meters (AVM's): detect the varieties of deviation in satellite orientation angles namely the roll angle, the compensation of earth's rotation angle (yaw) and stereo tilting angle (pitch).
Angular momentum sensor: measures the angular momentum (H) on reaction wheel.
Attitude actuators
Magnetic Torquers (MT): are used to generate magnetic dipole moment for attitude control. They apply a torque on the satellite by producing a magnetic field which interacts with the earth's magnetic field.
Reaction wheels (RW): are used in the rotational variant of Newton's third law. When the motor applies a torque to speed up or slow down the rotor, it produces a reacting torque on the body of the satellite. Normally, three reaction wheels; namely RWx, RWy and RWz are used to control a satellite, with the wheel axes aligned with the body principal axes. Reaction wheels are mounted on the body axes of the satellite. EgyptSat-1 uses the orbit frame as a reference point. Its Zo axis points the center of earth, Xo axis directs toward the motional direction of the satellite and Yo axis completes the coordinate axis system. Fig. 2 explains the orbit and body reference frames.
ADCS modes
ADCS contains five modes, each one is a function of satellite operation. This section introduces definitions of these modes (Awais Abbas and Mikael Eklund, 2011) .
Mode of De-tumbling and Construction of the orbital coordinate system (MDC): This mode is intended to decrease the satellite angular velocity obtained after its separation from the LV (launch vehicle) up to an acceptable value and the satellite orientation in the orbital coordinate system.
Standby mode (SB): Standby mode (SB) is intended to ensure the satellite orientation in the specified orbital coordinate system with minimum power consumption as well as minimum use of ADCS device resources.
Programed tilting mode (PTM): The PTM is intended to ensure the satellite angular orientation and stabilization within all imaging modes. PTM actuators are the three ADCS reaction wheels. The star sensor and the angular velocity meters are used to determine the satellite attitude with the high accuracy and to form controlling signals to the actuators.
High accuracy orientation in the orbital coordinate system (MOCS): The MOCS is intended for the satellite orientation and stabilization in the orbital coordinate system (OCS) and in case of necessity to discharge the reaction wheels.
Emergency Mode (EM): Emergency mode (EM) is intended for the cases when nominal modes of ADCS operation cannot be implemented. At emergency mode some functions will be controlled (for example, navigation, determination of attitude parameters, ON/OFF for specific instruments, telemetry data acquisition etc.) and corrected by uplink commands from the ground. Contingencies include uncontrolled angular motion of the satellite.
ADCS normal operation algorithm
The flowchart in Fig. 3 summarizes the ADCS mode sequence flow. ADCS starts with the initial stabilization mode, which is automatically loaded in satellite initial flight task in the platform command data handling subsystem. After a specific time, ADCS transfers to standby mode, if ADCS fails to transfer from initial stabilization mode to standby mode from the first time, the ADCS onboard software is designed to restart the initial stabilization mode. These trials are recorded in a specific ADCS memory counter for three times, this counter is incremented by 1 for each trial. If the system failed 3 times to transfer to standby mode, ADCS software algorithm transfers to the emergency mode and then it spends more than 90 min to start initial stabilization mode again. In case ADCS software succeeded to transfer to standby mode from the first time, the ADCS transfers from standby mode to programed tilting mode, and then it transfers to high accuracy orientation mode in the orbital coordinate system. From the design of satellite attitude determination and control software, the execution sequence of initial stabilization mode or programed tilting mode can't be interrupted from the ground control station. ADCS algorithm can be only interrupted in standby mode and high accuracy mode. Fig. 4 summarizes the time activity diagram of the ADCS in different modes, where the X axis represents time, Xo is a start time of imaging preparation, X1 is a start time of communication session in standby mode, X2 is a start of imaging time, X3 is a start time of high accuracy mode for discharging of angular momentum on reaction wheels, and X+10 is the end of communication session time. In imaging mode, the satellite runs all ADCS sensors and actuators. In initial stabilization mode, a group of devices are activated according to ADCS designed algorithm. These devices are MM, MT, AVM and reaction wheel (z). In this mode the reaction wheel (x) is not supposed to be in activate operation mode. If reaction wheel (x) is activated due to any malfunction or any other reasons, it should be switched-off from ground control station by specific telecommand. In standby mode the MM's, MT's, RWz or RWy devices are supposed to be activated. In this mode reaction wheel (y) is almost activated to compensate the difference in earth's rotation angle (Yaw). In PTM mode all ADCS devices are supposed to be activated until imaging time finishes. In this mode, ground control station cannot take any decision if any error is found in any device, because the design of ADCS on board software cannot be interrupted. After PTM mode finishes, the MOCS mode starts to strip down the momentum in satellite reaction wheels within 40-60 s. If the satellite exceeds this time without dis-charging the momentum, then the ground control station can take a decision by changing the satellite mode from high accuracy to standby mode. Table 1 explains the relation between ADCS mode and the possible activated devices according to ADCS activity time diagram.
ADCS up-normal operation
In normal operation, ADCS works correctly according to the software design, as it periodically checks the change in the operation mode and the reading telemetry parameters for relative devices every one second. In case of finding any malfunctions, the MCC can handle them by sending real time Tele-commands from the ground control station to the satellite on board computer. But as the communication session time is very limited, the ground control station may fail to send that command at the same time. In this situation the ground control station records the error and solves it in the nearest contact time.
2.1.6. The ADCS of EgyptSat-1 as a case study
From EgyptSat-1 practices, telemetry parameter analysis results explain a set of errors, which may lead to lose satellite orientation and get into instability mode. Satellite spends from 45 to 60 min to restart standby mode according to the ADCS algorithm. Through the instability mode, any telemetry data saved on the satellite onboard computer memory will be lost and cannot be recovered again. The early prediction of the ADCS problems can save the satellite from the instability mode. The approach predicts the ADCS actuator malfunction from the deterioration of telemetry reading parameters in ground control station. The other fault detection and isolation (FDI) system techniques -spectral analysis technique (Tudoroiu and Khorasani) and least-squares parameter technique (Jiang et al.) -increase the autonomy of satellite on board computer, and the FDI becomes more and more sophisticated, but the proposed real time prediction and correction approach of ADCS on-board computer recovery rules are based on satellite health monitoring parameter orientation from ground control station.
Results and discussion
Typical rules of reaction wheels in different ADCS modes
From ADCS on board computer design software, Table 2 shows angular momentum values in different satellite operation modes. The execution sequence of initial stabilization mode or program tilting mode can't be interrupted by the ground control station. The ADCS on board software sequences can be interrupted in standby mode to correct the status of reaction wheel by switching ON/OFF the power of the wheel, in condition that no angular momentum (H) is applied.
To control ADCS subsystem through real time operation, a group of crisp rules is designed in the form of 
Generally speaking, a collection of crisp rules will be designed for the ADCS reaction wheel actuators to damp undesired angular momentums generated in different modes. To simplify the case, the following four rules focus on failure detection and correction only in standby mode. Rule 2: IF ((Telemetry readings of satellite on AVMz) tells ''completion of preparation of SB mode" AND (speed of wheel-drive (Z) is non-zero)) THEN (send real time Tele command number to switch off RWz). Rule 3: IF ((Telemetry readings of satellite on AVMy tells ''completion of preparation of standby mode SB"AND ''speed wheel drive (Y -reserve) is non-zero") AND ''speed of wheel drive (Y -main) is non-zero") THEN (send real time Tele-command designated to switch off RWy-reserve). Rule 4: IF (Telemetry readings tells: (completion of PTM mode preparation) AND (PTM mode completed) AND (MOCS mode is active) AND (momentum on reaction wheel Y exceeds defined value of stability)) THEN (send Tele command to switch on preparation of standby mode).
Problems of ADCS control using crisp logic
Sending correct telecommands after having clear readings on malfunction of reaction wheels in a specific mode, will allow the system to go through the cycle of ADCS activity diagram. The cycle may take as typical time of 45 min as in EgyptSat-1ADCS system design, which is an undesired delay. This is explained in Fig. 3 . The available time for the human expert to predict the problem and take the suitable decision of sending a correct telecommand is around 30 s, which is a very critical time.
The critical values of angular momentums on reaction wheels that change the system from stability to instability state, cannot be defined accurately. Some cases -such as the case in Rule 4 -cannot define the risky status to send corresponding Tele command to change the mode, but this system is designed to switch the reaction wheels off, and then make the fuzzy logic solve the problem. Accessing the ADCS mode rather than the reaction wheels will push the satellite into the correct mode to strip down the abnormal momentums on reaction wheels.
In a typical case study on EgyptSat-1, telemetry reading shows an abnormal kinetic momentum on reaction wheel (y) after finishing the PTM mode. Figs. 5 and 6 show the fast response after applying the high accuracy mode and standby mode respectively. The two figures show response times of 4 s and one second respectively. That gives us the idea of studying the temporary changes of momentums on reaction wheels before reaching the risky values, the idea is to get damping of angular velocities as well as re-orientation of satellite in very short time.
Fuzzy control of ADCS reaction wheels
Taking the problems listed above about using the crisp logic rules in real time control of the ADCS into consideration, fuzzy logic represented is more suitable for that system. Fig. 7 summarizes the approach for an ADCS feedback fuzzy control system; where the proportional integral derivative (PID) controller receives corrective telecommand from the MCC operator due to the decision of its fuzzy rule base. It then produces the controlling torques that control the reaction wheels. The reaction wheel output is the angular momentum which is fed into the satellite onboard system. As the input of a classical PID controller is the error between the system output and reference input, the fuzzy inference is used to tune the PID parameters to provide nonlinear mapping between the instantaneous error values and the corresponding corrective PID parameters (Wertz) .
As for the typical fuzzy logic control systems, our ADCS controller includes the typical four parts namely the knowledge base, the fuzzifier, the fuzzy inference engine working on fuzzy rules, and the defuzzifier. Fig. 8 .
The knowledge base for our system comprises a collection of fuzzy rules in the form given in Eq. (1) while adding a measure of belief for each rule. The level of belief should be established depending on the certainty value of the premise. Taking the Bayes rule for calculating the certainty factor into consideration, the following expression will hold for our fuzzy rules
Multiple premise rules are used in this calculation because there is more than one premises value for the designed rules, and these values use logic state (and) together to construct body rules, in this case the minimum value for the evidence is multiple in the certainty factor values, this means the first evidence (E1) is logically used (and) process with the second evidence (E2) and so on, in ADCS mode of operations there are many evidences used at the same time to define the final hypothesis (H) with certainty factor percentage.
This rule interprets as the certainty factor of a hypothesis H given logical AND of evidences E1, E2, etc. is calculated as the minimum value of certainty factors of individual evidences multiplied by the measure of belief of the whole rule. A modified version of Rule 4 while adding fuzzification would be in the form: According to Fig. 4 the activation of satellite reaction wheels (x, y, z) is related to satellite mode of operation. The measure of belief (MB) for each mode of operation is indicated by successful transfer to next state of operation i.e. if the satellite transferred from SB mode to PTM mode smoothly without any problems this means (SM) measurement of belief (MB) is one and if satellite transfer from PTM mode to MOCS mode smoothly without any problems this means that MB for PTM is one and so on.
Interpretation of certainty factors
Recalling Rule 5 while taking the fuzziness into consideration, the following steps will be applied to calculate certainty factor of the rule for different situations.
Rule (5) should fire with a certainty factor that our hypothesis of reaching a risky situation given some evidences. These evidences are finishing the preparation to PTM mode, finishing the PTM mode, being in active MOCS mode, and having the angular momentum on reaction wheel y is increasing. Eq. (2) will then be adapted to our situation.
Considering the gaussian distribution to represent probability density function of changing the momentum on reaction wheel (y), and supposing a positive linear correlation between the positive change in angular momentum on reaction wheel (y) and the probability of entering the instability mode; Table 3 contains typical readings of momentum values on reaction wheel (y) of EgyptSat-1 system associated with the corresponding probability values of getting into risky situations. These values are used to calculate the certainty factor of rule 5. Table 3 contains a case study of momentum value 0.265 on reaction wheel (y), associated with the corresponding calculation to set the certainty factor of the rule given that the momentum was increasing on reaction wheel (y). N.B. Mean value (l) of the momentum distribution was 0.265, and the standard deviation (r) was calculated as 0.0043. A typical probability density function (PDF) was considered as
3.5. A typical case study of EgyptSat-1satellite ADCS reaction wheel certainty of belief
The observation of evidences (E) produces the belief in occurrence of hypothesis (H) with certainty factor percentage (Table 4 )
3.6. Simulation on a case study from Egypt-Sat1 ADCS subsystem A typical application of Rule (5) is simulated. Figs. 7 and 8 show the simulation results of the case before and after applying the rule respectively. Referred to Fig. 3 , the PTM mode was finished with telemetry readings showing an increase in kinetic momentum on reaction wheel y which (if left increasing) may lead to getting the satellite into tumbling. The solution due to applying Rule 5 fire standby mode. Figs. 9(a) , and 10(a) show the orientation of the satellite. The un-stability shown in orientation is accepted since the damping of the kinetic momentum will take place to lead to final stability within a maximum of 15 min. The same idea applies for the angular velocity un-stability shown in Figs. 9 (c) and 10(c). Fig. 10(d) compared to Fig. 9(d) shows the damping effect on the kinetic momentum on reaction wheels.
The image for that is the decay on the angles of the reaction wheels shown in Fig. 9 (b) compared to Fig. 10(b) .
Figure 9
Simulation results of the case before applying the rule.
Figure 10
Simulation results of the case after applying the rule.
Interpretation of Results of simulation on EgyptSat-1 system model
Typical simulation showed that the value of H-RWy (momentum on reaction wheel y) is increased timely to the critical value (H-RWy > 0.265), when the system reached this value the probability of tumbling mode (MDC) is increased and ADCS on board computer starts to stabilize satellite again within 45 min. Calculating the certainty factor of RULE5 could save the satellite before transfer to tumbling mode. Table 5 explains the critical value which fires the fuzzy rule.
Column (1) in Table 5 indicates the preparation of program tilting mode was done, the parameters are verified through telemetry database, column (2) indicate program tilting mode was done, column (3) indicate high accuracy mode was done, the two Columns 1 and 2 take the same value (1) to indicate the transition between preparation and stabilization of PTM mode is successfully done, column 3 takes value (1) to indicate that MOCS mode is successfully done, Column (4) splits into 2 sub-Column, the first Column indicates that there is a difference in reading in the reaction wheel (Y and r) value between two concatenation times (t, t À 1), the second one is values of CF for the different Column (5) explained in (5.1), the CF of Rule Column reflects the probability of using this commands.
In addition to taking the correct action within real time, the simulation process showed the definition of the critical values of the kinetic momentum on reaction wheels to a typical value of H-RWy P 0.268. If that value is left to increase, it may frequently cause a tumbling mode (MDC).
Starting from the value of (H-RWy P 0.265) the rule is firing and sends Telecommand to switch off main reaction wheel (RWy) and let the reserve reaction wheel to working normally.
The aim of strapping-down inertial of the system is to change the satellite control modes of operation from high accuracy mode to standby mode, this change is done by sending a telecommand from ground control station to the satellite to start strapping down the momentum on reaction wheel (y) from 0.265 to normal value 0.255 and keep the satellite away from tumbling mode.
In case of undefined error, satellite on board computer turns on the error checking mode in ADCS system, to form a request to platform command data handling subsystem, to switch off all ADCS on board devices, and then switch it on again, which may take a long time.
Conclusions
The main objective of this paper is to develop a real time prediction and correction of ADCS Problems in LEO satellites using fuzzy logic development control technique.
This research provides fault detection and correction of the ADCS systems in LEO satellites using a collection of fuzzy rules which are based on telemetry real time reading data from the satellite. The handling of ADCS reaction wheel fault diagnoses and recovery is very important in real time within the satellite communication session. Prediction of the error is based on satellite health monitoring and analysis data to support taking decision in a real time, where human intervention is risky in case of unexpected failure, because of the short time of communication session. That approach increases ground control station autonomy to enhance fault recover time.
This concept can be used with other satellite subsystem malfunctions to provide a real time control from ground control station. The future work will use another fuzzy logic technique like Neural Network. 
